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7 Critical Insights To Take Control Of EMIR Delegated Reporting

EMIR Refit: The Growing Challenges of EMIR Delegated Reporting

Delegated reporting has long been a common route for asset managers, relatively smaller banks and financial market entities to access derivatives markets efficiently. Under EMIR Refit, many firms continue to rely on executing brokers or counterparties to fulfil their reporting obligations.
However, regulatory guidance from ESMA and the FCA is clear: delegation does not remove accountability. As EMIR Refit is now firmly embedded into business-as-usual operations, firms are reassessing whether delegated models alone provide sufficient accuracy, completeness, oversight, and control to meet supervisory expectations.

1. Accountability Cannot Be Delegated

While reporting can be operationally delegated, legal responsibility always remains with the counterparty delegating the reporting (identified in the report as “Entity Responsible for Reporting”). Firms remain fully accountable for the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of EMIR submissions, regardless of who submits the report.
In practice, this means that regulators frequently engage directly with entities (e.g., asset managers) regarding reporting deficiencies, even when counterparties/brokers were responsible for the submissions. Firms, therefore, carry regulatory exposure while depending on counterparties/brokers to investigate, remediate, and back-report errors.

2. Fragmentation Across Counterparties Undermines Data Quality

Most asset managers delegate reporting to multiple brokers or counterparties. Each counterparty typically applies its own interpretations of EMIR Refit requirements, enrichment logic, lifecycle handling, and remediation approach.


This fragmented operating model frequently leads to inconsistent regulatory interpretation, inaccurate field population, lifecycle mismatches, reconciliation breaks, and both under- and over-reporting. Without centralised oversight, firms struggle to form a consolidated and accurate view of their overall reporting posture. RegAssure solves this problem by providing a centralised assurance platform for all your reporting needs, covering your own and delegated reporting.

3. Back-Reporting Is Now Expected, Not Exceptional

Supervisors increasingly view back-reporting as a core component of ongoing data quality management rather than an exceptional remediation exercise.
Where reporting is delegated, firms often have limited influence over the scope, timing, and prioritisation of back-reporting, particularly once supervisory scrutiny has begun. Firms must also maintain Trade Repository connectivity to submit corrected historical reports.
We regularly observe scenarios where brokers delay or refuse back-reporting, significantly increasing operational pressure and regulatory risk for the reporting firm. Moreover, reporting firms frequently rely on brokers [in case of delegated reporting] for details for the E&O forms, creating frustrating situations.

4. Lower Volume Firms Face Disproportionate Risk

Lower-volume firms are often deprioritised by brokers for remediation and back-reporting activities, despite being subject to identical regulatory obligations.
This creates a structural imbalance: full regulatory accountability combined with reduced operational leverage. In practice, many firms face prolonged remediation timelines while remaining exposed to supervisory escalation.

5. E&O Monitoring Is a Core Supervisory Expectation

Supervisors increasingly expect firms to proactively identify, quantify, and explain reporting errors. Reactive responses to regulatory queries are no longer sufficient.
Even where reporting is delegated, firms must remain close to the data to understand exception drivers, recurring issues, and qualitative and quantitative thresholds for Error & Omission (E&O) notifications.

6. Delegated Reporting Can Restrict Best Execution

Dependence on brokers for reporting can unintentionally constrain counterparty choice and market access. Trading decisions may become influenced by reporting capability rather than price, liquidity, or execution quality.
This creates tension with best execution obligations, particularly where firms limit trading activity to counterparties perceived as operationally easier from a reporting perspective.

7. The Hidden Cost of “Free” Delegated Reporting

Many executing brokers promote delegated reporting as a free service. However, firms are increasingly questioning whether it is truly free when assessed through a total cost of ownership (TCO) lens.
Hidden and indirect costs frequently include:

  • Repeated back-reporting exercises
  • Senior management involvement in escalations and regulatory engagement
  • Ongoing operational frustration within regulatory reporting teams
  • Increased risk of fines, supervisory scrutiny, and remediation programmes
  • Reputational damage arising from persistent data quality issues
    At the same time, many asset managers hesitate to bring reporting in-house due to perceived concerns around:
  • High implementation costs
  • Ongoing maintenance complexity
  • Resourcing specialist regulatory expertise
    The result is continued dependency on counterparties, even where that dependency increases long-term cost, operational friction and regulatory risk.

How Reg-X Can Help

Reg-X enables firms to meet EMIR Refit expectations by restoring control, strengthening assurance, and reducing the total cost of ownership, while still supporting delegated models where appropriate.

  • RegAssure Middleware – Centralised EMIR trade reporting, enabling accurate, complete and timely reporting and trading with any counterparty globally without reporting constraints
  • RegAssure Accuracy – Independent field-level testing of reported and test trades to support Article 9 accuracy obligations for both own and delegated reporting, ensuring issues are identified early
  • RegAssure Completeness – Front-office-to-Trade-Repository reconciliation to identify missing, under-reported, or over-reported activity for both own and delegated reporting
  • RegAssure E&O AnalyticsQualitative and quantitative threshold analysis, recurring issue identification, and E&O notification support aligned to FCA and ESMA expectations
  • RegAssure Back ReportingOn-demand back-reporting capability, reducing reliance on counterparties during remediation
    By bringing reporting, assurance and back reporting into a single controlled framework:
  • Regulatory operations teams experience less rework and frustration
  • Senior management gains clearer oversight and confidence
  • Regulatory and reputational risk is materially reduced
  • Total cost of ownership of EMIR reporting is lowered

Conclusion

Under EMIR Refit, delegated reporting without independent assurance is no longer sufficient. Regulators expect firms to evidence effective controls over accuracy, completeness, oversight, remediation, and E&O governance.


Delegation must be actively governed, evidenced, and controlled, not passively trusted.

The question is no longer “Is delegated reporting free?”
It is “What does it truly cost over time?”

References

  • UK EMIR Article 9 – obligation to report derivatives accurately and completely
  • ESMA EMIR Q&A (Trade Repositories)
  • Section 1, Q1.1: Delegation does not transfer responsibility
  • Section 1, Q1.3: Firms must ensure the accuracy and completeness of reported data
  • FCA MAR 5A.3.1R – reports must be accurate, complete, and timely
  • FCA SUP 15.3 – obligation to deal with regulators in an open and cooperative manner
  • ESMA EMIR Q&A – Section 1, Q1.4: Firms must monitor the quality of delegated reporting
  • ESMA EMIR Data Quality Reports: Fragmentation and inconsistent interpretation cited as key drivers of poor data quality
  • FCA MAR 5A.3.4G: Firms should have systems and controls to identify inaccuracies
  • ESMA EMIR Q&A – Section 2, Q2.3: Firms must correct erroneous reports without undue delay
  • FCA MAR 5A.3.1R: Ongoing obligation to correct inaccurate or incomplete reports
  • FCA SUP 15.6: Requirement to notify regulators of material errors and remediation actions
  • UK EMIR Article 9 – obligations apply irrespective of firm size
  • FCA Principles for Businesses – Principle 11 – firms must deal with regulators openly and responsibly
  • ESMA EMIR Q&A – Section 1, Q1.6: Firms must assess the materiality of reporting errors
  • FCA SUP 15.3 and 15.6: Requirement to notify material errors and submit E&O notifications
  • FCA COBS 11.2A – obligation to take all sufficient steps to obtain the best possible result for clients

https://handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/cobs11

https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-updates-emir-qa%E2%80%99s